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ΠΑΓΚΥΠΡΙΟΣ ΔΙΚΗΓΟΡΙΚΟΣ ΣΥΛΛΟΓΟΣ
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(1969) 2 CLR 1
1969 January 9
[VASSILIADES, P., TRIANTAFYLLIDES, JOSEPHIDES, JJ.]
VARNAVAS K. VARNAKKIDES,
Appellant,
v.
THE POLICE,
Respondents.
(Criminal Appeal No. 3035).
Road Traffic—Motor Traffic—Collision at cross—roads—"Halt" sign—Appeal against conviction on a charge for careless driving contrary to regulations 13(p) and 17 of the Nicosia Municipal Traffic Bye-Laws 1952-1956—"Halt" sign on side-road—Appellant driving on main road—Failure of the side-road driver to stop at "halt" sign—Appellant did not have, in the circumstances, a duty to anticipate that the other driver would not have stopped at the "halt" sign—Therefore, the appeal was allowed and the conviction quashed.
"Halt" sign—"Halt" sign on side-road—Duty of a driver driving on the main road—See above.
Careless driving—See above.
The facts of this case sufficiently appear in the judgments whereby the appeal was allowed and the appellant's conviction for careless driving quashed.
Appeal against conviction.
Appeal against conviction by Varnavas K. Varnakkides who was convicted on the 11th September, 1968, at the District Court of Nicosia (Criminal Case No. 16485/68) on one count of the offence of driving a motor vehicle contrary to regulation 13 (p) and 17 of the Nicosia Municipal Traffic Bye-Laws 1952-1956 and was bound over by Hji Tsangaris, D.J., in the sum of £30 for one year to come up for judgment.
D. Papachrysostomou, for the appellant.
M. Kyprianou, Counsel of the Republic, for the respondents.
VASSILIADES, P.: I will ask Mr. Justice Triantafyllides to deliver the first judgment.
TRIANTAFYLLIDES, J.: In this case the appellant appeals against his conviction, by the District Court of Nicosia, on the 11th September, 1968, on a charge of driving a motor vehicle carelessly, contrary to regulations 13(p) and 17 of the Nicosia Municipal Traffic Bye-Laws, 1952-1956 ; the particulars of the charge being that on the 30th March, 1968, the appellant drove his car CC417 at the cross-road of Alasia and Michalopoullou Streets, in Nicosia, without due care and attention.
Actually, at such cross-road a collision occurred between the car driven by the appellant, along Michalopoullou Street, and another car, DE510, which was coming from his left, along Alasia Street.
It is not in dispute that at the cross-road in, question there is a " halt " sign, for the purpose of bringing to a stop, before crossing, the traffic proceeding along Alasia Street from the direction from which car DE510 was coming.
The appellant, while being about 30 metrs away from the cross-road, noticed the other vehicle coming from his left toward the cross-road, at a great speed ; it was then at quite some distance, yet, from the cross-road ; about 180 metres away.
The learned trial Judge, though he held that by far the greater blame for the collision lay with the other driver, proceeded to find the apellant, too, guilty of negligence, in that, having seen the other vehicle coming at a speed towards the cross-road, he did not take such measures as to enable him to avoid a probable collision.
Counsel for the respondents, in trying to support the conviction, submitted that, in the circumstances, the appellant had to anticipate the posssibility of the other car crossing the cross-road against the " halt " sign and that, therefore, he ought to have stopped and allowed such other car to pass.
With due respect for the views of the learned Judge and counsel, I find myself unable to agree, in the light of the facts of this particular case, that the appellant has in any way been in breach of his duty to exercise due care and attention.
In my opinion the duty of a driver is to guard against reasonably probable dangers and he is not expected to anticipate every remote eventuality.
It is true that the appellant saw the other car coming, at a great speed, from his left, towards the cross-road; but, at the time, such car was much further away than his car from the cross-road and the appellant had the right of way, in view of the " halt " sign in Alasia street; so, I cannot accept that it was reasonable to expect from the appellant to have anticipated that the other driver—even though he was going at a great speed—would not have stopped at the " halt " sign, a thing which he had both the time and the duty to do. To hold otherwise would amount to putting, in a case like the present one, an undue burden on a law-abiding driver, such as the appellant, in favour of a lawbreaker, such as the driver of the other car; and it would render meaningless the method of controlling a cross-road by means of "halt" signs.
In the circumstances I have no difficulty in agreeing with learned counsel for the appellant that the facts, as found by the trial Court, should not have led to the conviction of the appellant, and that his conviction, and the sentence imposed on him, have to be set aside.
VASSIUADES, P.: I agree. I would decide this case on the same ground as my brother Mr. Justice Triantafyllides has decided it. But I would also reach the same decision even by a simpler process.
The case arises from the collision of two motor cars at a cross-road. Such a collision may give rise to civil claims and may also give rise to criminal liability. This court is not concerned with the way in which a civil court could look upon this same collision. The approach is different; and the consequences are different. In a criminal prosecution the position is that the driver who is negligent has a criminal liability regardless of the negligence of the other driver. If the collision is due to the negligence of the accused, either entirely or partly, his criminal liability is established. But not until then The prosecution has to show criminal negligence beyond reasonable doubt; and to avoid confusion, the appropriate statute speaks of criminal liability for driving without due care and attention.
In this case, the court found that the appellant was guilty of careless driving because, as submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents, he did not anticipate the collision from the fact that the other driver was coming very fast and was driving in such a reckless manner. Appellant was found careless in that he did not foresee that the other driver would not stop at the " halt " sign, as he, in fact, did not stop; and thus the collision occurred.
I find myself entirely unable to accept such a proposition. The collision of those two vehicles is no doubt a matter of a very short distance covered by each of those two moving vehicles in a small fraction of a second. If the fast, reckless driver coming on towards a " halt " sign on the left side of the appellant, slightly reduced his speed, as he could reasonably be expected to do the collision would not have occurred. On the other hand the appellant could not reasonably anticipate that the other driver, coming towards a "halt" sign, would not slow down; but would continue driving as fast into the crossing, regardless of the "halt" sign.
In such circumstances, I find myself, entirely unable to find carelessness in the driving of the appellant; and I would quash the conviction.
JOSEPHIDES, J.: I also agree. The trial judge found the appellant guilty of negligent driving on the basis stated in his judgment, that is to say, " that a prudent driver should approach such or any cross-road with caution and when, as in this case, he sees a vehicle coming out of the other road at that speed, it is his duty to take such measure, as to enable him to avoid a probable collision" With great respect to the learned judge, it seems to me that he has given no weight to the presence of the " halt " sign on the road against the other driver. To my mind, in the circumstances of this case, the "halt" sign against the other driver is decisive. I am of the view that the appellant had no duty to stop at the cross road and wait for the other driver to pass, at a time when the latter was driving along a road where he had an express duty to halt. The possibility of danger could not reasonably be apparent to the appellant as a driver on that day, and he cannot be held to have been negligent. I would, therefore, allow the appeal and quash the conviction.
VASSILIADES, P.: In the result, appeal allowed. Conviction quashed.
Appeal allowed; conviction quashed.