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ΠΑΓΚΥΠΡΙΟΣ ΔΙΚΗΓΟΡΙΚΟΣ ΣΥΛΛΟΓΟΣ
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(1978) 3 CLR 45
1977 December 31
[HADJITANASTASSIOU, J.]
IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 146 OF THE CONSTITUTION
CHARILAOS GEORGHIOU REAL ESTATE CO. LTD.
AND ANOTHER,
Applicants,
v.
THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THROUGH
THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND/OR
THE DISTRICT LANDS OFFICE NICOSIA,
Respondent.
(Case No. 130/73).
Persons who Sustained Losses (Exemption from Taxation) (Temporary Provisions) Law, 1968 (Law 34 of 1968)-"ζημιωθείς"("person who sustained loss") in the definition section 2 of the Law- It only includes natural persons and not legal persons.
Statutes-Construction-Interpretation section-Principles applicable-Construction of "ζημιωθείς" ("person who sustained loss") in the definition section 2 of Law 34 of 1968.
The applicant company, being owners of immovable property within the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, applied for exemption from payment of immovable property tax, pursuant to the provisions of the Persons who Sustained Losses (Exemption from Taxation) (Temporary Provisions) Law, 1968 (Law 34 of 1968). Their application was refused by the respondent on the ground that it did not fall within the provisions of the above Law, presumably its definition section 2 which defines the word "Ζημιωθείς" ("person who sustained loss").
The sole question in issue in this recourse was whether the word "Ζημιωθείς" ("person who sustained loss") as set out* in the definition section 2 of the aforesaid law could include, also,
Quoted in full at p. 48 post.legal persons, such as the Applicant Company and not only natural persons.
Held, (1) the making of the law is a matter for the legislature and not for the Courts. The Courts are not entitled to canvass the power of Parliament to make any statute or to query the propriety or wisdom of making it; and in construing the said definition section this court should not base its construction on its view of what Parliament ought to have done, because in the construction of an interpretation section, it must be presumed that Parliament has been specially precise and careful in its choice of language, so that the rule that words are to be interpreted according to their ordinary and natural meaning carries special weight.
(2) This Court should not, therefore, extend the said definition section as to include matters (i.e. legal persons) which the legislature for reasons best known to them have not included therein.
Application dismissed.
Cases referred to:
A. G. v. Antigua Times [1975] 3 All E.R. 81;
Sewell v. Burdick [1884] 10 App. Cas. 74, at p. 105 (H. L.);
River Wear Commissioners v. Adamson [1877] 2 App. Cas. 743 at p. 764 (H.L.);
Bristol Guardians v. Bristol Waterworks Co. [1914] A.C 379 at p. 387 (H.L.);
Vacher and Sons Ltd., v. London Society of Compositors [1913] A.C. 107 at p. 113 (H.L.);
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Hinchy [1956-60] 38 T.C. 625 (H.L.);
Redford v. Republic (1970) 3 C.L.R. 409;
Re Wykes' Will Trusts [1961] 1 All E.R. 470 at p. 477.
Recourse.
Recourse against the decision of the respondent refusing to exempt the applicants from paying immovable property tax.
E. Efstathiou, for the applicants.
N. Charalambous, Counsel of the Republic, for the respondent.
Cur.adv. vult.
HADJIANASTASSIOU J. read the following judgment. In these proceedings, under Article 146 of the Constitution, theapplicantss company seeks to challenge the decision of the respondent in refusing to exempt the said company from paying immovable property tax.
The facts are very simple indeed. CharilaosGeorghiou Real Estate Co. Ltd., was registered under the Companies Law in Cyprus, and the second applicant and his two daughters Rena Nicolaou and ArgyroEconomidou are the shareholders of the said company. This company is the owner of immovable property which is situated within the Turkish Quarter of the area of the Old Nicosia, and because of the recent events in Cyprus-due to the troubles between the Greeks and the Turks- the said property was out of bounds (aprospelastosperiohi) to the Greek Community.
The second applicants are members of the Greek community and are citizens of the Republic of Cyprus. On January 26, 1973, the District Officer of L.R.O of Nicosia addressed a letter to the said company informing them that with regard to their application for exemption from an immovable property tax, of the property situated within the area of Ayia Sofia for the years 1968-1970, it was refused because it did not fall within the provisions of Law 34/68.
The applicant company, feeling aggrieved because of the refusal of the administration to grant them an exemption from an immovable property tax-a practice which they followed in the past-filed the present recourse.
In support of the said application, it was alleged that the acts and or decisions of the respondent were taken in abuse or in excess of powers and in contravention of the provisions of Law 34/68 and or under a misconception of the true construction of the law itself.
On June 27, 1973, counsel on behalf of the respondent filed the opposition, alleging that the said decision was taken in accordance with the provisions of Law 34/68, having regard to the basic facts of that case. It has not been challenged that the property in question, as I said earlier, is situated within an area which is out of bounds, as it is defined in the definition section 2 of Law 34/68. The sole question, therefore, is whether the decision of the administration is contrary to the provisionsof the law, and particularly the definition section which says that:-
"2. Εν τω παρόντι Νόμω, εκτός εάν εκ του κειμένου προκύπτη διάφορος έννοια -
'ζημιωθείς' σημαίνει πολίτην της Δημοκρατίας — Έλληνα, Αρμένιον, Λατίνον ή Μαρωνίτην — όστις είναι ιδιοκτήτης ακινήτου ιδιοκτησίας κειμένης εντός περιοχής.
'περιοχή' σημαίνει περιοχήν ήτις κατέστη απροσπέλαστος εις ζημιωθέντα λόγω των από της 21ης Δεκεμβρίου 1963 δημιουργηθεισών συνθηκών και περιλαμβάνει περιοχήν γειτνιάζουσαν προς οιανδήποτε τοιαύτην περιοχήν."
("2. In this Law, unless the context otherwise requires:- 'person who sustained loss' means a citizen of the Republic-Greek, Armenian, Latin or Maronite-who is the owner of immovable property situated within an area;
'area' means an area which has been rendered out of bounds to the person who sustained loss due to the conditions that have been created since the 21st December 1963 and includes an area which abuts any such area").
Counsel, in his able argument, although realizing that this is a question of construction of section 2, and particularly with regard to the word "zimiothis", argued that it was the intention of the legislature to include not only a Greek, Armenian, Latin or a Maronite-being the owners of immovable property situated within that area, but it was meant to include or extend such exemption from paying immovable property tax, not only to the citizens of the Republic, but also to legal persons viz., a company which was registered under the Companies Law.
Counsel further argued that this being a piece of welfare legislation, the Court could draw the inference that the legislature intended in enacting that legislation to protect the interest of both the natural persons and the legal ones from paying a property tax once they can not utilize their property situated in an area to which they are prevented from having an access.
On the contrary, counsel on behalf of the respondent, in his able argument said that in view of the definition section ofthe law, the word "zimiothis" has to be given its meaning as defined by the legislature itself, and cannot be extended to any other legal persons, but the ones which in their wisdom the legislators said clearly and unambiguously that it would apply only viz., to the citizens of the Republic-Greek, Armenian, Latin or Maronite, who are the owners of immovable property situated within that area. Once, therefore, the legislator made it clear who were the citizens who would receive the benefit of that welfare legislation, the Court cannot interfere with the decision of the administration and should not interfere to supplement the language of the legislature.
There is no doubt that this is a very interesting point raised by counsel, and the applicant company has my full sympathy in feeling aggrieved against the decision of the administration.But having read the whole law, I have been kept wondering why, having regard to this welfare legislation, the legislature thought fit to exclude from the provisions of this law, the companies which are also owners of a property situated in the very same area and which remains out of bounds for the use by the owners, including the company in question. As I said, one would have expected that both the citizens themselves and the companies which have paid dues to register as such, and also paid for transferring the property in the name of the companies should continue not to pay property tax, and should have been placed on the same footing as the rest of the citizens of this land whose property is out of bounds.
Having expressed my sentiment on this point, and having reached the conclusion that such a treatment could have been considered as illogical, I am bound to treat it as a simple point of law. Of course, had the legislature, instead of using the word "politis" (citizen of the Republic) had used the word "person", I would have had no difficulty in saying that in accordance with the definition section 2 of the interpretation Law Cap. 1, "person" includes any company or body of persons corporate or unincorporate. But, unfortunately, this is not the case. (See A.G. v. Antigua Times [1975] 3 All E.R. 81).
It has been said in a number of cases by this Court that it is the province of the legislature to enact statutes, and of the Courts to construe the statutes which the legislature has enacted. Since the interpretation of the law is, a matter for the Courts,nthe Courts are not bound by an expression of Parliament's opinion expressed in or to be inferred from a statute as to what the law is, (Sewell v. Burdick [1884] 10 App. Cas. 74, H.L., at p. 105), as distinct from a positive enactment itself creating or declaring law, although where a statute is ambiguous, such statements of opinion may be considered. In the case in hand, the Court has been invited not only to interpret the definition section which the legislature itself has thought fit to define, both with regard to the wording in the definition section 2 "zimiothis", but also with regard to the meaning of "periohi" (area), and I would add once again that this Court should not extend the definition section as to include matters which the legislature for reasons best known to them have not included in the definition section. I would, therefore, reiterate, once again, that the making of the law is a matter for the legislature and not for the Courts, and this has been said since the year 1877, in River. Wear Commissioners v. Adam- son [1877] 2 App. Cas. 743, H.L., at p. 764, per Lord Blackburn; see also, Bristol Guardians v. Bristol Water. Works Co., [1914] A.C. 379 H.L. at p. 387 per Lord Loreburn, that the Courts are not entitled to canvass the power of Parliament .to make any statute or the propriety or wisdom of making it, that is to say, of including also not only the natural persons, but also the legal persons, that is, the companies registered under the Cyprus Law: See Vacher and Sons Ltd. v. London Society of Compositors, [1913] A.C. 107 H.L. at p. 113.
In Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Hinchy, [1956-60] 38 T.C. 625 (H.L.), Lord Reid said at p. 652:-
"What we must look for is the intention of Parliament, and I also find it difficult to believe that Parliament ever really intended the consequences which flow from the Crown's contention. But we can only take the intention of Parliament from the words which they have used in the Act, and, therefore, the question is whether those words are capable of a more limited construction. If not, then we must apply them as they stand, however unreasonable or unjust the consequences and however strongly we may suspect that this was not the real intention of Parliament."
See also John W. Redford v. Republic (Minister of Finance), (1970) 3 C.L.R. 409, where I adopted and followed that case.
Finally, directing myself with these weighty judicial authorities, I have reached the conclusion that this Court is not entitled to canvass the power of Parliament to make a new statute or to query the propriety or wisdom of making Law 34/68. In construing the definition section, the Court should not therefore, base the construction of that statute on its view of what Parliament ought to have done in that case, because in the construction of an interpretation section, it must be presumed that the House of Representatives has been specially precise and careful in its choice of language, so that the rule that words are to be interpreted according to their ordinary and natural meaning (Vacher& Sons Ltd. (supra)), carries special weight. (Re Wykes' Will Trusts [1961] 1 All E.R. 470 at p. 477 per Buckley J.).
For the reasons I have advanced, I would affirm the decision of the administration that the applicants were not entitled to be exempted from paying immovable property tax, and I would dismiss, this recourse, but I am not proposing to make an order as to costs.
Application dismissed.
No order as to costs.