|
ΠΑΓΚΥΠΡΙΟΣ ΔΙΚΗΓΟΡΙΚΟΣ ΣΥΛΛΟΓΟΣ
|
|
|
(1977) 1 CLR 120
1977 February 22
[TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P., STAVRINIDES, L. LOIZOU, JJ.]
MANOLIS STAVROU,
Appellant,
v.
MOBIL LP GAS (CYPRUS) LTD.,
Respondents.
(Case Stated No. 161).
Termination of Employment Law, 1967 (Law 24 of 1967) as amended by Law 1 of 1975-Termination of services on ground of redundancy-Dispute concerning mode of calculation of amount to be paid to employee out of the Fund under a collective agreement-An industrial dispute in the sense of s. 30 of the Law-Sections 3, 5, 16, 17, and 18 of the Law-Fact that provisions of s. 17, concerning payments out of the Fund, have been suspended by virtue of Law 1 of 1975 (supra) not a sufficient reason for finding that there was no longer an industrial dispute to be determined by the Industrial Disputes Court.
Master and Servant-Termination of services-Redundancy-See, also, under "Termination of Employment Law, 1967".
Industrial Disputes Court-Jurisdiction--Section 30 of the Termination of Employment Law, 1967 (Law 24 of V 1967)-See, also, under "Termination of Employment Law, 1967".
Following the termination of the employment of the appellant in August 1974, on grounds of redundancy, a dispute arose between him and the respondents (his employers) concerning the length of the period to be taken into account in calculating a payment to be made to him by the respondents under a collective agreement.
The appellant applied to the industrial Disputes Court for the determination of the dispute; and the Court took the view that, in the circumstances, it had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter, because there was no dispute before it as regards the lawfulness or not of the termination of the employment of the appellant and all that was in dispute between the parties was the calculation of the sum to be paid to the appellant under a collective agreement.
Hence the present appeal by way of a Case Stated.
The jurisdiction of the Industrial Disputes Court is to be found in section 30(1) of the Termination of Employment Law, 1967 (Law 24/67), as re-enacted by section 3 of Law 6/73, which reads as follows:
"(1) The Industrial Disputes Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate on all industrial disputes arising as a result of the application of the present Law or of any Regulations made under it or of both, including all matters incidental or complementary to such disputes".
Counsel for the appellant contended that since in section 17(1) of Law 24/67 there is express reference to the right to compensation for redundancy under a collective agreement, the Industrial Disputes Court had jurisdiction to deal with the matter before it in the present case.
Held, (1) that though it is correct that section 17 of Law 24/67 is only applicable to cases of redundancy as defined in section 18, on the basis of the contents of the Case Stated, this Court does not think that it can be said, with any certainty, that the termination of the services of the appellant for redundancy is not an instance coming within the ambit of section 18.
(2) That once there arises, under section 17, in relation to the payment of compensation for redundancy, as provided for under a collective agreement, the possibility of making a payment to an employee from the Fund, the calculation of the exact amount payable to the redundant employee under the collective agreement is directly related to the application of a provision of Law 24/67; and that, accordingly, any dispute as to the mode of the calculation of that amount-such as the one in the present case-is an industrial dispute in the sense of section 30 of Law 24/67, which defines the jurisdiction of the Industrial 'Disputes Court (see, also, sections 3, 5, 16, 17 and 18 of Law 24/67).
(3) That the fact that by Law 1/75 in a case such as that of the termination of the services of the appellant for redundancy the provisions of section 17 have been suspended in so far as payments out of the fund are concerned, was not a sufficient reason for finding that there was no longer an industrial dispute to be determined by the Industrial Disputes Court in the present case, because the amount payable to the appellant, under the collective agreement, had still to be determined; and that, accordingly, the Industrial Disputes Court had jurisdiction to deal with the matter.
Appeal allowed.
Case Stated.
Case Stated by the Chairman of the Industrial Disputes Court relative to his decision of the 20th September, 1975, in proceedings, under section 3 of the Termination of Employment Law, 1967 (Law 24 of .1967) instituted by Manolis Stavrou against Mobil LP Gas (Cyprus) Ltd. whereby his claim for compensation was dismissed, on the ground that the Industrial Disputes Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter.
E. Efstathiou, for the appellant.
A. Dikigoropoullos, for the respondent.
Cur.adv. vult.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by:-
TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P.: The appellant appeals, by way of a Case Stated, to this Court against the decision of the Industrial Disputes, Court (in application No. 260/74) by virtue of which it was held that the said Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter taken before it by the appellant.
The said matter was, in effect, a dispute between the appellant and the respondents concerning the length of the period to be taken into account in calculating a payment to, be made, by the respondents to the appellant, under a collective agreement, due to the termination of the services of the appellant on the ground of redundancy.
That the services of the appellant were rightly terminated by the respondents, on the above ground, was not in dispute between the parties.
The Industrial Disputes Court took the view that, in the circumstances, it had no jurisdiction to deal with the aforementioned matter, because there was no dispute beforeit as regards the lawfulness or not of the termination of the employment of the appellant and all that was in dispute between the parties was the calculation of the sum to be paid to the appellant under a collective agreement.
The jurisdiction of the Industrial Disputes Court is to be found in section 30 of the Termination of Employment Law, 1967 (Law 24/67), as re-enacted by section 3 of the Termination of Employment (Amendment) Law, 1973 (Law 6/73); for the purposes of the present case the material part of section 30 is subsection (1), which reads as follows:
" (1) To Δικαστήριον Εργατικών Διαφορών κέκτηται αποκλειστικήν αρμοδιότητα να αποφασίζη επί απασών των εργατικών διαφορών των αναφυομένων συνεπεία της εφαρμογής του παρόντος Νόμου ή οιωνδήποτε Κανονισμών εκδοθέντων δυνάμει αυτού ή αμφοτέρων, περιλαμβανομένου και παντός παρεμπίπτοντος ή συμπληρωματικού προς τοιαύτας διαφοράς θέματος".
("(1) The Industrial Disputes Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate on all industrial disputes arising as a result of the application of the present Law or of any Regulations made under it or of both, including all matters incidental or complementary to such disputes".).
The Industrial Disputes Court, in reaching the conclusion that it had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter before it, referred to sections 3, 5 and 16 of Law 24/67.
Section 3, above, reads as follows:-
" 3. Όταν, κατά ή μετά την ορισθείσαν ημέραν, ο εργοδότης τερματίζη δι' οιονδήποτε λόγον άλλον ή των εν τω άρθρω 5 εκτιθεμένων λόγων, την απασχόλησιν εργοδοτουμένου ο όποιος έχει απασχοληθή συνεχώς υπ' αυτού επί εικοσιέξ τουλάχιστον εβδομάδας, ο εργοδοτούμενος κέκτηται δικαίωμα εις αποζημίωσιν καταβαλλομένην υπό του εργοδότου του και υπολογιζομένην συμμώνως προς τον Πρώτον Πίνακα:
Νοείται ότι εργοδότης και εργοδοτούμενος δύναται δι' εγγράφου συμβάσεως συναφθείσης κατά τον χρόνον της προσλήψεως του εργοδοτουμένου να παρατείνωσι την υπό του παρόντος άρθρου προβλεπομένην περίοδον συνεχούς απασχολήσεως μέχρις ανωτάτου ορίου εκατόν τεσσάρων εβδομάδων".
("3. Where, on or after the appointed day, an employer terminates for any reason Other than those set out in section 5 the employment of an employee who has been continuously employed by him for not less than twenty-six weeks, the employee shall have a right to compensation payable by his employer and calculated in accordance with the First Schedule:
Provided that an employer and an employee may by agreement in writing made at the time the employee enters into the employment extend the period of continuous employment provided by this section to a maximum of one hundred and four weeks".).
The material part of section 5, above, is paragraph (b) thereof, which reads as follows:-
"5. Τερματισμός απασχολήσεως δι' οιονδήποτε των ακολούθων λόγων δεν παρέχει δικαίωμα εις αποζημίωσιν:
(α)...................
(β) όταν ο εργοδοτούμενος κατέστη πλεονάζων υπό την έννοιαν του Μέρους IV".
("5. Termination of employment for any of the following reasons shall not give rise to a right to compensation:-
(a)...................
(b) where the employee has become redundant within the meaning of Part IV".).
Subsection (1) of section 16, above, is the material part of such section and it reads as follows:-
"16. (1) Όταν κατά ή μετά την οριοσθείσαν ημέραν η απασχόλησις εργοδοτουμένου απασχοληθέντος συνεχώς επί εκατόν τέσσαρας εβδομάδας ή πλέον υπό του αυτού εργοδότου τερματίζηται λόγω πλεονασμού, ο εργοδοτούμενος δικαιούται εις πληρωμήν λόγω πλεονασμού εκ του Ταμείου:
Νοείται ότι ο Υπουργός δύναται, διά Διατάγματος δημοσιευθησομένου εις την επίσημον εφημερίδα της Δημοκρατίας, να ελαττώση τον υπό του παρόντος εδαφίου καθοριζόμενον αριθμόν εβδομάδων συνεχούς απασχολήσεως ούτως ώστε να ληφθώσι υπ' όψιν τακτικαί εποχιακαί διακυμάνσεις εις την απασχόλησιν εν οιωδήποτε επαγγέλματι ή ειδική επιχειρήσει".
("16. (1) Where, on or after the appointed day, the employment of an employee who has been continuously employed for one hundred and four weeks or more by the same employer is terminated because of redundancy the employee shall be entitled to a redundancy payment from the Fund:
Provided that the Minister may, by Order to be published in the official Gazette of the Republic, re15 duce the number of weeks of continuous employment prescribed by this sub-section to take account of regular seasonal fluctuations in employment in any trade or specific business".).
Section 16 is to be found in Part IV of Law 24/67. By section 2 of the Termination of Employment (Amendment) Law, 1975 (Law 1/75), it was provided that the provisions in Part IV of Law 24/67 concerning the right of employees to payments, because of redundancy, from the Fund-(the Fund being that which is referred to in section 16 of Law 24/67)-is suspended in relation to instances where the employment has been terminated, or will be terminated after July 14, 1974; and it appears to be common ground, in the present case, that the employment of the appellant was terminated on the ground of redundancy in August, 1974.
The Industrial Disputes Court seems to have taken the view that because it was conceded by the appellant that his employment had been terminated on the ground of redundancy, and that was a ground mentioned in section 5(b) of Law 24/67, it followed that there was no dispute as regards the application of section 3 of the same Law, in the present case, since such section 3 relates to instances other than those in which the termination of employment has taken place under the said section 5.
The Industrial Disputes Court, furthermore, took the view that since there was no dispute before it concerningthe application of section 3 of Law 24/67 it could not be said that the dispute as to the length of the period to be taken into account in calculating the amount payable to the appellant by the respondents, under the collective agreement concerned, was a matter within section 30(1) of Law 24/67, so that it would come within its jurisdiction.
By counsel for the appellant we have been referred to section 17 of Law 24/67, which reads as follows:-
"17. (1) "Οταν λόγω πλεονασμού, ως ούτος καθορίζεται εν τω άρθρω 18, εργοδοτούμενος δικαιούται κατά ή μετά την ορισθείσαν ημέραν εις οιανδήποτε άμεσον πληρωμήν λόγω πλεονασμού, χορήγημα λόγω απολύσεως, φιλοδώρημα ή οιανδήποτε άλλην πληρωμήν τοιούτου ποσού χορηγουμένου εν σχέσει προς την απασχόλησιν του παρ' εργοδότη, είτε το δικαίωμα τούτο υφίσταται λόγω εθίμου, νόμου, συλλογικής συμφωνίας, συμβάσεως είτε δι' άλλον λόγον, εάν το ποσόν της πληρωμής ταύτης υπερβαίνη την πληρωμήν την οποίαν ο εργοδοτούμενος θα ελάμβανεν εν αναφορά προς τον Τέταρτον Πίνακα, ο εργοδοτούμενος λαμβάνει το μεγαλύτερον των δύο ποσών:
Νοείται ότι κατά τον υπολογισμόν του δυνάμει του παρόντος εδαφίου οφειλομένου εις τον εργοδοτούμενον ποσού οιαδήποτε εισφορά γενομένη υπό του εργοδοτουμένου έναντι της τοιαύτης πληρωμής λόγω πλεονασμού, χορηγήματος λόγω απολύσεως, φιλοδωρήματος ή άλλης πληρωμής τοιούτου ποσού και οιοσδήποτε τόκος επί τοιαύτης εισφοράς αφαιρείται.
(2) Όταν εν περιπτώσει πλεονασμού εργοδοτούμενος δικαιούται εις πληρωμήν ως καθορίζεται εν τω εδαφίω (1) του παρόντος άρθρου και η τοιαύτη πληρωμή ισούται προς την πληρωμήν εις την οποίαν ο εργοδοτούμενος δικαιούται δυνάμει του Τετάρτου Πίνακος ή είναι μικροτέρα ταύτης, τότε πληρώνονται εις τον εργοδοτούμενον τα ακόλουθα:
(α) ο εργοδοτούμενος λαμβάνει παρά του εργοδότου ή εξ οιουδήποτε ταμείου ή άλλης διευθετήσεως λειτουργούσης διά λογαριασμόν του εργοδότου το συμφώνως προς το εδάφιον (1) του παρόντος άρθρου οφειλόμενον ποσόν·
(β) η διαφορά μεταξύ του δυνάμει του Τετάρτου Πίνακος οφειλομένου ποσού και του δυνάμει του εδαφίου (1) του παρόντος άρθρου οφειλομένου ποσού πληρώνεται εις τον εργοδοτούμενον υπό του Ταμείου.
(3) Όταν ο εργοδοτούμενος δικαιούται δυνάμει του εδαφίου (1) του παρόντος άρθρου εις πληρωμήν μεγαλυτέραν εκείνης την οποίαν θα ελάμβανεν εν αναφορά προς τον Τέταρτον Πίνακα, τότε πληρώνονται εις τον εργοδοτούμενον τα ακόλουθα:
(α) ο εργοδοτούμενος λαμβάνει εκ του Ταμείου το ποσόν το όποιον θα ελάμβανεν εάν η πληρωμή του υπελογίζετο εν αναφορά προς τον Τέταρτον Πίνακα.
(β) η διαφορά μεταξύ του εν αναφορά προς τον Τέταρτον Πίνακα υπολογιζομένου ποσού και του δυνάμει του έδαφίου (1) του παρόντος άρθρου οφειλομένου ποσού πληρώνεται απ' ευθείας εις τον εργοδοτούμενον υπό του εργοδότου ή εξ οιουδήποτε ταμείου ή άλλης διευθετήσεως λειτουργούσης διά λογαριασμόν του εργοδότου".
("17. (1) Where because of redundancy, as defined in section 18, an employee is entitled, on or after the appointed day, to any immediate redundancy payment, severance pay, gratuity or any other such lump sum payment granted in relation to his employment with an employer, whether this entitlement is by reason of custom, law, collective agreement, contract or otherwise, if the amount of that payment is in excess of the payment the employee would receive by reference to the Fourth Schedule then the employee shall receive the greater of the two sums:
Provided that in calculating the amount due to the employee under this sub-section any contribution made by the employee towards such redundancy payment, severance pay, gratuity or other such lump sum payment and any interest on such a contribution shall be discounted.
(2) Where, on redundancy, an employee is entitled to a payment as specified in sub-section (1) of this section and that payment is equal to or less thanthe payment to which the employee is entitled under the Fourth Schedule, then payment shall be made to the employee as follows:-
(a)the employee shall receive from the employer or from any fund or other arrangement operated on behalf of the employer the amount due in accordance with sub-section (1) of this section;
(b)the difference between the amount due under the Fourth Schedule and the amount due under sub-section (1) of this section shall be paid to the employee by the Fund.
(3) Where an employee is entitled under sub-section (1). of this section to a greater payment than that he would receive by reference to the Fourth Schedule, then payment shall be made to the employee as follows:-
(a) the employee shall receive from the Fund the amount he would have received had his payment been calculated by reference to theFourth Schedule;
(b) the difference between the amount calculated by reference to the Fourth Schedule and the amount due under sub-section (1) of this section shall be paid by the employer or from any fund or other arrangement operated on behalf of the employer, direct to the employee".).
It was argued by counsel for the appellant that, since in sub-section (1) of section 17 there is express reference to the right to compensation for redundancy under a collective agreement, the Industrial Disputes Court had jurisdiction to deal with the matter before it in the present instance.
It is useful to refer, also, i order to complete, as much as it is reasonably necessary for the purposes of this case, the picture of the relevant and interrelated legislative provisions, to section 18 and subsection (3) of section 16 of Law 24/67.
Section 18 reads as follows:-
"18. Δια τους σκοπούς του παρόντος Νόμου, εργοδοτούμενος είναι πλεονάζων όταν η απασχόλησίς του ετερματίσθη δια λόγους άλλους των καθοριζομένων εν τη πρώτη επιφυλάξει του εδαφίου (3) του άρθρου 16:-
(α) διότι ο εργοδότης έπαυσεν ή προτίθεται να παύση να διεξάγη την επιχείρησιν εν τη οποία ο εργοδοτούμενος απησχολείτο· ή
(β) διότι ο εργοδότης έπαυσεν ή προτίθεται να παύση να διεξάγη επιχείρησιν εις τον τόπον όπου ο εργοδοτούμενος απησχολείτο:
Νοείται ότι το Διαιτητικόν Δικαστήριον δυνατόν να αποφασίση ότι αλλαγή του τόπου απασχολήσεως δεν προκαλεί πλεονασμόν όταν, κατά την γνώμην του Διαιτητικού Δικαστηρίου, είναι λογικόν ως προς τον εργοδοτούμενον ο όποιος διεκδικεί πληρωμήν λόγω πλεονασμού να αναμένηται όπως ο εργοδοτούμενος ούτος συνεχίση την απασχόλησίν του εις τον νέον τόπον απασχολήσεως· ή
(γ) ένεκα οιουδήποτε των ακολούθων άλλων λόγων σχετιζομένων προς την λειτουργίαν της επιχειρήσεως:
(i) εκσυγχρονισμού, μηχανοποιήσεως ή οιασδήποτε άλλης αλλαγής εις τας μεθόδους παραγωγής ή οργανώσεως ή οποία ελαττώνει τον αριθμόν των αναγκαιούντων εργοδοτουμένων·
(ii) αλλαγών εις τα προϊόντα ή τας μεθόδους παραγωγής ή εις τας αναγκαιούσας ειδικότητας των εργοδοτουμένων·
(iii) καταργήσεως τμημάτων
(iv) δυσκολιών εις την τοποθέτησιν προϊόντων εις την αγοράν ή πιστωτικών δυσκολιών
(ν) ελλείψεως παραγγελιών ή πρώτων υλών
(vi) σπάνεως μέσων παραγωγής· και
(vii) περιορισμού του όγκου της εργασίας ή της επιχειρήσεως".
("18. For the purposes of this Law, an employee is redundant when his employment has been terminated for reasons other than those specified in the first proviso to sub-section (3) of section 16 of this Law:
(a) because the employer has ceased or intends to cease to carry on the business in which the employee was employed; or
(b) because the employer has ceased or intends to cease to carry on business in the place in which the employee was employed:
Provided that the Tribunal may decide that change of place of employment does not cause redundancy when, in the opinion of the Tribunal, it is reasonable, in respect of the employee claiming a redundancy payment, to expect that employee to continue his employment in the new place of employment; or
(c) because of any of the following other reasons concerned with the operation of the business:
(i) modernization, mechanization or any other change in methods of production or of organization which reduces the number of employees necessary;
(ii) changes in products or production methods or in the skills needed on the part of employees;
(iii) closing of departments;
(iv) marketing or credit difficulties;
(v) lack of orders or raw materials;
(vi) scarcity of means of production; and
(vii) contraction of the volume of work or business".).
Subsection (3) of section 16 reads as follows:-
"(3) το ποσόν της πληρωμής λόγω πλεονασμού υπολογίζεται συμφώνως προς τον Τέταρτον Πίνακα:
Νοείται ότι όταν, ως αποτέλεσμα του πλεονασμού, έχη μειωθή ή κατά την γνώμην του Διαιτητικού Δικαστηρίου ενδέχεται να μειωθή το κόστος της παραγωγής ή λειτουργίας της επιχειρήσεως ως συνόλου ή του κλάδου της επιχειρήσεως εις τον οποίον προεκλήθη πλεονασμός ή θα διατηρηθώ ουσιωδώς το αυτό ή θα επιτευχθή υψηλότερον επίπεδον παραγωγής ή κατά την γνώμην του Διαιτητικού Δικαστηρίου ενδέχεται να διατηρηθή ή επιτευχθή διά μικροτέρου αριθμού εργοδοτουμένων, το ποσόν της λόγω πλεονασμού πληρωμής υπολογίζεται εν αναφορά προς τον Πρώτον Πίνακα, ως εάν η πληρωμή απετέλει αποζημίωσιν επιδικασθείσαν εις εργοδοτούμενον δυνάμει του άρθρου 3:
Νοείται περαιτέρω ότι, όταν το Διαιτητικόν Δικαστήριον αποφασίση ότι ο πλεονασμός εμπίπτει εντός της προηγουμένης επιφυλάξεως του παρόντος εδαφίου, η περίοδος η όποια παρέχει το δικαίωμα διά πληρωμήν λόγω πλεονασμού είναι εικοσιέξ εβδομάδες, ουχί δε εκατόν τέσσαρες εβδομάδες ως προνοείται υπό του εδαφίου (1) του παρόντος άρθρου".
("(3) The amount of the redundancy payment shall be calculated in accordance with the Fourth Schedule:
Provided that where, as a result of the redundancy, there has been or, in the opinion of the Tribunal, is likely to be, a reduction in the cost of production or running of the business as a whole or of the branch of the business in which redundancy has occurred or substantially the same level of production will be maintained or a higher one will be attained or in the opinion of the Tribunal it is likely to be maintained or attained with a smaller number of employees, the amount of the redundancy payment shall be calculated by reference to the First Schedule, as if the payment were compensation awarded to an employee under section 3:
Provided further that where the Tribunal decides that a redundancy falls within the preceding proviso to this sub-section the qualifying period for a redundancy payment shall be twenty-six weeks and not one hundred and four weeks as provided by sub-section (1) of this section".)
Counsel for the respondents has pointed out that section 17 of Law 24/67 is, only applicable to cases of redundancy "as defined in section 18"; that is correct, but on the basis of the contents of the Case Stated before us, we do not think that it can be said, with any certainty, that the termination of the services of the appellant for redundancy is not an instance coming within the ambit of section 18.
We are, furthermore, of the opinion, that once there arises, under section 17, in relation to the payment of compensation for redundancy, as provided for under a collective, agreement, the possibility of making a payment to a employee from the Fund, the calculation of the exact amount payable to the redundant employee under the collective agreement is directly related to the application of a provision of Law 24/67; and, thus, any dispute as to the mode of the calculation of that amount-such as the one in the present caseis an industrial dispute in the sense of section 30 of Law 24/67, which, as already stated, defines the jurisdiction of the Industrial Disputes Court.
The last point with which we have to deal the fact that, by virtue of Law 1/75, above, in a case such as that of the termination of the services of the appellant for redundancy the provisions of section 17-(which is in Part IV of Law 24/67)-have been suspended in so far as there are concerned payments out of the Fund.
In our view this was not a sufficient reason for finding that there was no longer an industrial dispute to be determined by the Industrial Disputes Court in the present case because the amount payable to the appellant, under the collective agreement, had still to be determined; of course, to what extent such amount should have been paid, and from what source, was another matter, depending on the construction of the provisions of the collective agreement concerned and other relevant considerations; and as this is an issue in relation to which we have not heard any arguments we leave it open.
For the foregoing reasons we find that the Industrial Disputes Court has jurisdiction to deal with the matter taken before it by the appellant and, therefore, it shouldproceed to do so under the provisions of the relevant legislation.
In view of the novelty of the issue raised m this case we shall not make any order as to the costs of the proceedings before us.
Appeal allowed.